IRAN TRAVEL VIDEO——COLORFUL PERSIAN
Iran is the favorite country I have been to. She is warm, friendly and safe, and has too many colorful scenes. Please don't misunderstand her. She is also an ancient civilization with a history of 5,000 years. You are here, you will fall in love with it. I am grateful to those who have helped me during my trip to Iran, and to all the Iranian friends who have appeared in the picture.
Victory Day of the Iranian Revolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Iran, a mountainous, arid, and ethnically diverse country of southwestern Asia. Much of Iran consists of a central desert plateau, which is ringed on all sides by lofty mountain ranges that afford access to the interior through high passes. Most of the population lives on the edges of this forbidding, waterless waste. The capital is Tehrān, a sprawling, jumbled metropolis at the southern foot of the Elburz Mountains. Famed for its handsome architecture and verdant gardens, the city fell somewhat into disrepair in the decades following the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79, though efforts were later mounted to preserve historic buildings and expand the city’s network of parks. As with Tehrān, cities such as Eṣfahān and Shīrāz combine modern buildings with important landmarks from the past and serve as major centres of education, culture, and commerce. The heart of the storied Persian empire of antiquity, Iran has long played an important role in the region as an imperial power and later—because of its strategic position and abundant natural resources, especially petroleum—as a factor in colonial and superpower rivalries. The country’s roots as a distinctive culture and society date to the Achaemenian period, which began in 550 bce. From that time the region that is now Iran—traditionally known as Persia—has been influenced by waves of indigenous and foreign conquerors and immigrants, including the Hellenistic Seleucids and native Parthians and Sasanids. Persia’s conquest by the Muslim Arabs in the 7th century ce was to leave the most lasting influence, however, as Iranian culture was all but completely subsumed under that of its conquerors. An Iranian cultural renaissance in the late 8th century led to a reawakening of Persian literary culture, though the Persian language was now highly Arabized and in Arabic script, and native Persian Islamic dynasties began to appear with the rise of the Ṭāhirids in the early 9th century. The region fell under the sway of successive waves of Persian, Turkish, and Mongol conquerors until the rise of the Safavids, who introduced Twelver Shiʿism as the official creed, in the early 16th century. Over the following centuries, with the state-fostered rise of a Persian-based Shiʿi clergy, a synthesis was formed between Persian culture and Shiʿi Islam that marked each indelibly with the tincture of the other. With the fall of the Safavids in 1736, rule passed into the hands of several short-lived dynasties leading to the rise of the Qājār line in 1796. Qājār rule was marked by the growing influence of the European powers in Iran’s internal affairs, with its attendant economic and political difficulties, and by the growing power of the Shiʿi clergy in social and political issues. The country’s difficulties led to the ascent in 1925 of the Pahlavi line, whose ill-planned efforts to modernize Iran led to widespread dissatisfaction and the dynasty’s subsequent overthrow in the revolution of 1979. This revolution brought a regime to power that uniquely combined elements of a parliamentary democracy with an Islamic theocracy run by the country’s clergy. The world’s sole Shiʿi state, Iran found itself almost immediately embroiled in a long-term war with neighbouring Iraq that left it economically and socially drained, and the Islamic republic’s alleged support for international terrorism left the country ostracized from the global community. Reformist elements rose within the government during the last decade of the 20th century, opposed both to the ongoing rule of the clergy and to Iran’s continued political and economic isolation from the international community. Land Iran is bounded to the north by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, and the Caspian Sea, to the east by Pakistan and Afghanistan, to the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and to the west by Turkey and Iraq. Iran also controls about a dozen islands in the Persian Gulf. About one-third of its 4,770-mile (7,680-km) boundary is seacoast. Relief of Iran A series of massive, heavily eroded mountain ranges surrounds Iran’s high interior basin. Most of the country is above 1,500 feet (460 metres), with one-sixth of it over 6,500 feet (1,980 metres). In sharp contrast are the coastal regions outside the mountain ring. In the north a strip 400 miles (650 km) long bordering the Caspian Sea and never more than 70 miles (115 km) wide (and frequently narrower) falls sharply from 10,000-foot (3,000-metre) summits to the marshy lake’s edge, some 90 feet (30 metres) below sea level. Along the southern coast the land drops away from a 2,000-foot (600-metre) plateau, backed by a rugged escarpment three times as high, to meet the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The Zagros (Zāgros) Mountains stretch in a northwest-southeast direction, from Iran’s borders with Turkey and Iraq in the northwest to the Strait of Hormuz in the southeast. Farther to the south the range broadens into a band of parallel ridges 125 miles (200 km) wide that lies between the plains of Mesopotamia and the great central plateau of Iran. The range is drained on the west by streams that cut deep narrow gorges and water fertile valleys. The land is extremely rugged and difficult to access and is populated largely by pastoral nomads. The Elburz (Alborz) Mountains run along the south shore of the Caspian Sea to meet the border ranges of the Khorāsān region to the east. The tallest peak in the chain is the snow-clad Mount Damāvand (Demavend), which is also Iran’s highest point. Many parts of Iran are isolated and poorly surveyed, and the elevation of many of its peaks are still in dispute; the height of Mount Damāvand is generally given as 18,605 feet (5,671 metres). Volcanic and tectonic activity Mount Taftān, a massive cone reaching 13,261 feet (4,042 metres) in southeastern Iran, emits gas and mud at sporadic intervals. In the north, however, Mount Damāvand has been inactive in historical times, as have Mount Sabalān (15,787 feet [4,812 metres]) and Mount Sahand (12,172 feet [3,710 metres]) in the northwest. The Sahand-Bazman Belt, formed by Eocene volcanism, extends some 1,200 miles (1,900 km) from the border with Azerbaijan in the northwest to Baluchistan in the southeast and includes volcanic peaks such as Mount Sahand, Mount Karkas in Eṣfahān province, Mount Lalahezar in Kermān province, and Bazman in Sīstān va Balūchestān province. In addition, in the northwestern section of the country, lava and ashes cover a 200-mile (320-km) stretch of land from Jolfā on the border with Azerbaijan eastward to the Caspian Sea. A third volcanic region, which is 250 miles (400 km) long and 40 miles (65 km) wide, runs between Lake Urmia (Orūmiyyeh) and the city of Qazvīn. Earthquake activity is frequent and violent throughout the country. During the 20th century—when reliable records were available—there were fully a dozen earthquakes of 7.0 or higher on the Richter scale that took large numbers of lives. In 1990 as many as 50,000 people were killed by a powerful tremor in the Qazvīn-Zanjān area. In 2003 a relatively weak quake struck the ancient town of Bam in eastern Kermān province, leveling the town and destroying a historic fortress. More than 25,000 people perished. The interior plateau The arid interior plateau, which extends into Central Asia, is bounded on the west by the Zagros Mountains, on the north by the Elburz Mountains and the Kopet-Dag (Koppeh Dāgh) Range, and on the south by the Bashagard Range, which extends east from the Strait of Hormuz into the Baluchistan region of Iran. The plateau is cut by several smaller mountain ranges. In the flatlands lie the plateau’s most-remarkable features, the Kavīr and Lūt deserts, also called the Dasht-e Kavīr and Kavīr-e Lūt. At the lowest elevations, series of basins in the poorly drained soil remain dry for months at a time; the evaporation of any accumulated water produces the salt wastes known as kavīrs. As elevation rises, surfaces of sand and gravelly soil gradually merge into fertile soil on the hillsides and mountain slopes. More … Source: https://www.britannica.com/place/Iran
Victory Day of the Iranian Islamic Revolution
Iranian Revolution, also called Islamic Revolution, Persian Enqelāb-e Eslāmī, popular uprising in Iran in 1978–79 that resulted in the toppling of the monarchy on February 11, 1979, and led to the establishment of an Islamic republic. Prelude To Revolution The 1979 revolution, which brought together Iranians across many different social groups, has its roots in Iran’s long history. These groups, which included clergy, landowners, intellectuals, and merchants, had previously come together in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11. Efforts toward satisfactory reform were continually stifled, however, amid reemerging social tensions as well as foreign intervention from Russia, the United Kingdom, and, later, the United States. The United Kingdom helped Reza Shah Pahlavi establish a monarchy in 1921. Along with Russia, the U.K. then pushed Reza Shah into exile in 1941, and his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi took the throne. In 1953, amid a power struggle between Mohammed Reza Shah and Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.K. Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) orchestrated a coup against Mosaddegh’s government. Years later, Mohammad Reza Shah dismissed the parliament and launched the White Revolution—an aggressive modernization program that upended the wealth and influence of landowners and clerics, disrupted rural economies, led to rapid urbanization and Westernization, and prompted concerns over democracy and human rights. The program was economically successful, but the benefits were not distributed evenly, though the transformative effects on social norms and institutions were widely felt. Opposition to the shah’s policies was accentuated in the 1970s, when world monetary instability and fluctuations in Western oil consumption seriously threatened the country’s economy, still directed in large part toward high-cost projects and programs. A decade of extraordinary economic growth, heavy government spending, and a boom in oil prices led to high rates of inflation and the stagnation of Iranians’ buying power and standard of living. In addition to mounting economic difficulties, sociopolitical repression by the shah’s regime increased in the 1970s. Outlets for political participation were minimal, and opposition parties such as the National Front (a loose coalition of nationalists, clerics, and noncommunist left-wing parties) and the pro-Soviet Tūdeh (“Masses”) Party were marginalized or outlawed. Social and political protest was often met with censorship, surveillance, or harassment, and illegal detention and torture were common. For the first time in more than half a century, the secular intellectuals—many of whom were fascinated by the populist appeal of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a former professor of philosophy in Qom who had been exiled in 1964 after speaking out harshly against the shah’s recent reform program—abandoned their aim of reducing the authority and power of the Shiʿi ulama (religious scholars) and argued that, with the help of the ulama, the shah could be overthrown. In this environment, members of the National Front, the Tūdeh Party, and their various splinter groups now joined the ulama in broad opposition to the shah’s regime. Khomeini continued to preach in exile about the evils of the Pahlavi regime, accusing the shah of irreligion and subservience to foreign powers. Thousands of tapes and print copies of Khomeini’s speeches were smuggled back into Iran during the 1970s as an increasing number of unemployed and working-poor Iranians—mostly new migrants from the countryside, who were disenchanted by the cultural vacuum of modern urban Iran—turned to the ulama for guidance. The shah’s dependence on the United States, his close ties with Israel—then engaged in extended hostilities with the overwhelmingly Muslim Arab states—and his regime’s ill-considered economic policies served to fuel the potency of dissident rhetoric with the masses. Outwardly, with a swiftly expanding economy and a rapidly modernizing infrastructure, everything was going well in Iran. But in little more than a generation, Iran had changed from a traditional, conservative, and rural society to one that was industrial, modern, and urban. The sense that in both agriculture and industry too much had been attempted too soon and that the government, either through corruption or incompetence, had failed to deliver all that was promised was manifested in demonstrations against the regime in 1978. Revolution In January 1978, incensed by what they considered to be slanderous remarks made against Khomeini in Eṭṭelāʿāt, a Tehrān newspaper, thousands of young madrasah (religious school) students took to the streets. They were followed by thousands more Iranian youth—mostly unemployed recent immigrants from the countryside—who began protesting the regime’s excesses. The shah, weakened by cancer and stunned by the sudden outpouring of hostility against him, vacillated between concession and repression, assuming the protests to be part of an international conspiracy against him. Many people were killed by government forces in anti-regime protests, serving only to fuel the violence in a Shiʿi country where martyrdom played a fundamental role in religious expression. Fatalities were followed by demonstrations to commemorate the customary 40-day milestone of mourning in Shiʿi tradition, and further casualties occurred at those protests, mortality and protest propelling one another forward. Thus, in spite of all government efforts, a cycle of violence began in which each death fueled further protest, and all protest—from the secular left and religious right—was subsumed under the cloak of Shiʿi Islam and crowned by the revolutionary rallying cry Allāhu akbar (“God is great”), which could be heard at protests and which issued from the rooftops in the evenings. The violence and disorder continued to escalate. On September 8 the regime imposed martial law, and troops opened fire against demonstrators in Tehrān, killing dozens or hundreds. Weeks later, government workers began to strike. On October 31, oil workers also went on strike, bringing the oil industry to a halt. Demonstrations continued to grow; on December 10, hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets in Tehrān alone. During his exile, Khomeini coordinated this upsurge of opposition—first from Iraq and after 1978 from France—demanding the shah’s abdication. In January 1979, in what was officially described as a “vacation,” the shah and his family fled Iran. The Regency Council established to run the country during the shah’s absence proved unable to function, and Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, hastily appointed by the shah before his departure, was incapable of effecting compromise with either his former National Front colleagues or Khomeini. Crowds in excess of one million demonstrated in Tehrān, proving the wide appeal of Khomeini, who arrived in Iran amid wild rejoicing on February 1. Ten days later, on February 11, Iran’s armed forces declared their neutrality, effectively ousting the shah’s regime. Bakhtiar went into hiding, eventually to find exile in France. Aftermath On April 1, following overwhelming support in a national referendum, Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic republic. Elements within the clergy promptly moved to exclude their former left-wing, nationalist, and intellectual allies from any positions of power in the new regime, and a return to conservative social values was enforced. The Family Protection Act (1967; significantly amended in 1975), which provided further guarantees and rights to women in marriage, was declared void, and mosque-based revolutionary bands known as komītehs (Persian: “committees”) patrolled the streets enforcing Islamic codes of dress and behaviour and dispatching impromptu justice to perceived enemies of the revolution. Throughout most of 1979 the Revolutionary Guards—then an informal religious militia formed by Khomeini to forestall another CIA-backed coup as in the days of Mosaddegh—engaged in similar activity, aimed at intimidating and repressing political groups not under the control of the ruling Revolutionary Council and its sister Islamic Republican Party, both clerical organizations loyal to Khomeini. The violence and brutality often exceeded that which had taken place under the shah. The militias and the clerics they supported made every effort to suppress Western cultural influence, and, facing persecution and violence, many of the Western-educated elite fled the country. This anti-Western sentiment eventually manifested itself in the November 1979 seizure of 66 hostages at the U.S. embassy by a group of Iranian protesters demanding the extradition of the shah, who at that time was undergoing medical treatment in the United States (see Iran hostage crisis). Through the embassy takeover, Khomeini’s supporters could claim to be as “anti-imperialist” as the political left. This ultimately gave them the ability to suppress most of the regime’s left-wing and moderate opponents. The Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregān), overwhelmingly dominated by clergy, put a new constitution to referendum the following month, and it was overwhelmingly approved. The new constitution created a religious government based on Khomeini’s vision of velāyat-e faqīh (Persian: “governance of the jurist”) and gave sweeping powers to the rahbar, or leader; the first rahbar was Khomeini himself. Moderates, such as provisional Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and the republic’s first president, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, who opposed holding the hostages, were steadily forced from power by conservatives within the government who questioned their revolutionary zeal. Score: https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution
Ambasador Iranu z wizytą w urzędzie marszałkowskim
Marszałek woj. mazowieckiego Adam Struzik spotkał się z ambasadorem Islamskiej Republiki Iranu w Polsce. Rozmowy dotyczyły możliwości współpracy gospodarczej i kulturalnej. Marszałek wspomniał o wizytach na Mazowszu w latach 2016–2017 delegacji z irańskich prowincji Chorasan, Chuzestan i Azerbejdżan Wschodni. Podkreślił bardzo dobre relacje międzyregionalne i duży potencjał współpracy w owym czasie. Wskazał przy tym na potrzebę ożywienia kontaktów.